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	<title>Comments on: J. K. Galbraith podcast</title>
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	<link>http://brainsnorkel.com/2006/02/02/j-k-galbraith-podcast/</link>
	<description>Manifesto-driven development.  Eclectic thoughts.</description>
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		<title>By: Chris</title>
		<link>http://brainsnorkel.com/2006/02/02/j-k-galbraith-podcast/comment-page-1/#comment-4845</link>
		<dc:creator>Chris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Feb 2006 22:52:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainsnorkel.com/?p=237#comment-4845</guid>
		<description>I&#039;m not terribly well read on this piece of history, but there&#039;s a relevant introduction earlier in the piece referring to recently declassified information, and Galbraith&#039;s recollections:



&lt;blockquote&gt;
What we now know from declassified material, material that’s in the book, is that contrary to the idea that Kennedy wanted to go into Vietnam, Kennedy, acting largely under advice from Ambassador Galbraith, was doing his utmost throughout his Administration, to keep us out. In November, 1961, Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy’s military advisor and Walt Rostow, who was then Deputy National Security Advisor, went out to Saigon. Both men were committed to US actually going into Vietnam, as were most of Kennedy’s senior advisors. And this is the tale. Which is that they prepared a report out of that November ’61 visit, that called upon the President to make the first significant contribution of US troops to Vietnam. But as Maxwell Taylor said in one of the recently-declassified records of conversations that he had with Secretary Macnamara and Secretary Ruskin, ‘General Taylor, we can’t move too quickly because the President is opposed’.&lt;/blockquote&gt;




Nonetheless, the reasoning seems to be pragmatic.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;m not terribly well read on this piece of history, but there&#8217;s a relevant introduction earlier in the piece referring to recently declassified information, and Galbraith&#8217;s recollections:</p>
<blockquote><p>
What we now know from declassified material, material that’s in the book, is that contrary to the idea that Kennedy wanted to go into Vietnam, Kennedy, acting largely under advice from Ambassador Galbraith, was doing his utmost throughout his Administration, to keep us out. In November, 1961, Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy’s military advisor and Walt Rostow, who was then Deputy National Security Advisor, went out to Saigon. Both men were committed to US actually going into Vietnam, as were most of Kennedy’s senior advisors. And this is the tale. Which is that they prepared a report out of that November ’61 visit, that called upon the President to make the first significant contribution of US troops to Vietnam. But as Maxwell Taylor said in one of the recently-declassified records of conversations that he had with Secretary Macnamara and Secretary Ruskin, ‘General Taylor, we can’t move too quickly because the President is opposed’.</p></blockquote>
<p>Nonetheless, the reasoning seems to be pragmatic.</p>
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		<title>By: Alastair</title>
		<link>http://brainsnorkel.com/2006/02/02/j-k-galbraith-podcast/comment-page-1/#comment-4844</link>
		<dc:creator>Alastair</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Feb 2006 20:58:02 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Chomsky&#039;s Rethinking Camelot discusses JFK&#039;s attitudes towards the Vietnam adventure, like Galbraith also relying on recently-released internal documents from the time. It has been a while since I read it, but the gist is that Kennedy was actually in favour of the invasion of Vietnam, because he was convinced he could win it. Chomsky goes on to say that there is nothing on the public *or private* record to show that Kennedy was idealogically opposed - his only reservations were pragmatic ones. I guess that this stance is supported by the snippet you posted above.

Thanks for the pointer, will listen.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Chomsky&#8217;s Rethinking Camelot discusses JFK&#8217;s attitudes towards the Vietnam adventure, like Galbraith also relying on recently-released internal documents from the time. It has been a while since I read it, but the gist is that Kennedy was actually in favour of the invasion of Vietnam, because he was convinced he could win it. Chomsky goes on to say that there is nothing on the public *or private* record to show that Kennedy was idealogically opposed &#8211; his only reservations were pragmatic ones. I guess that this stance is supported by the snippet you posted above.</p>
<p>Thanks for the pointer, will listen.</p>
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